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1. Introduction 
A compensation package of a firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) is in most cases only a tiny fraction of 
the firm’s total expenses and, thus, does not have a significant effect on the firm’s performance ratios on 
its own. However, compensation has a vital role in motivating and encouraging CEO to grow and improve 
the firm one is working for. Therefore, it is worth studying for whether a link between the CEO 
compensation and firm performance exists. 
Previous studies in the field have shown that such relation can be found (see e.g. Carter et al., 2016; Core 
et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2011; Cai & Walkling, 2011; Larcker et al., 2011). Ozkan (2011), Cai and Walkling 
(2011), and Larcker et al. (2011) documented existing relationship between the CEO compensation and 
shareholder return. Ozkan (2011) focused on pay-performance elasticity between total CEO compensation 
and total shareholder return and found that these have a positive correlation with each other. Cai and 
Walkling (2011) and Larcker et al (2011) studied shareholder return and Say-on-Pay regulation1. Both 
found that the regulation has a value-enhancing effect on firms which executives earned abnormally high 
compensations. In addition, Carter et al (2016) and Core et al (1999) found a significant and negative 
coefficient between the abnormal CEO compensation and firm performance measured in accounting based 
ratios. 
However, the previous researches have examined this pay-performance relation almost solely with US, UK 
or Japanese data while Europe as whole has been left disregarded. Kaplan (1997) discovered great 
differences in corporate governance practices among Japan, Germany and the US. He found that the CEO 
turnover rates and changes in CEO’s compensation are substantially uneven in different countries in various 
business-related events. In addition, Bruce et al. (2005) investigated the variation in CEO compensation 
habits between the UK and Germany and reported distinct differences. Due to reported diversity in CEO 
compensation policies and rationales behind them, the findings from previous studies cannot be applied 
globally. 
The main objective of this thesis is to test whether the link between abnormal chief executive compensation 
and subsequent firm performance exists in Europe. Replicating previous studies by Carter et al (2016), Cai 
and Walkling (2011) and Core et al. (2008), I start with building a model to estimate an expected CEO 
compensation which I use to calculate abnormal CEO compensation for each observation. Next, I conduct 
ordinary least squares and weighted least squares regression models explaining firm performance with the 
abnormal compensation to discover possible link between these measures. 
                                                          
1 The Say-on-Pay regulation refers to shareholders’ right to vote on CEO’s and other executive’s compensation 
packages (see e.g. Thomas & Van der Elst, 2015) 
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The thesis is structured in a following way: In Section 2, I present thoroughly existing studies in the field 
and their main findings. In addition, I present the hypotheses. Further in Section 3, I suggest models to test 
the hypotheses with and describe the data. Empirical results and robustness tests are presented and discussed 
in Section 4. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for further research are reviewed in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Variation in Governance and Compensation Practices Globally 
Kaplan (1997) compares governance practices and systems between Germany, Japan and the US. He finds 
that level of executive compensation is low in Japan, moderate in Germany and high in the US. Ownership 
of the firms is diffused in the US, concentrated in Germany and less concentrated in Japan. Moreover, 
capital and takeover markets are relatively illiquid and minor, somewhat liquid and minor, and very liquid 
and major in Germany, Japan and the US, respectively. A role of banking differs among the countries as 
well. 
In addition to these background characteristics of the governance systems, Kaplan (1997) reports diversity 
in likelihoods of CEO turnover and change in CEO compensation in various scenarios. According to the 
paper, likelihoods of negative and positive actions on the CEO compensation seem to be less sensitive to 
negative or positive business events in Japan and Germany compared to the US. Kaplan (1997) suggests 
that this is because of larger equity positions US executives hold compared to their German or Japanese 
colleagues: Poor or strong firm performance has more direct effect on executive’s own wealth in the US. 
Bruce et al. (2005) study these governance systems as well. In their statistical studies, Towers Perrin reports 
significant differences in a ratio between CEO compensation and average earnings of employees. Their 
results indicate that this ratio is over 500 in the US, approximately 25 in the UK and a little over 10 in 
France, Italy and Spain. (as cited in Bruce et al., 2005). Bruce et al. (2005) focus more closely on comparing 
the UK and Germany to the US, and despite the similarities in politics, demographic and economic factors, 
they report great differences in compensation practices between the UK and Germany and, in addition, 
between these two and the US.  
Furthermore, Thomas and Van der Elst (2015) examine Say-on-Pay regulations globally and point out 
numerous significant differences among the countries reviewed. First, shareholders’ influencing power in 
countries with two-tier boards are, in general, weaker when compared to ones with one-tier board structure. 
Second, the means of influencing vary remarkably across the countries. For example, Thomas and Van der 
Elst (2015) point out that in the US shareholders are entitled to set an individual pay package of directors 
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whereas in the UK shareholders are only allowed to vote on proposed remuneration package. Third, in some 
countries shareholders are entitled to influence in each executive’s compensation separately while in other 
countries shareholders vote on a general level of compensation for all executives. Finally, time span of 
influencing varies significantly. For example, in the US it may take up to three years until shareholders can 
cast their vote. In the Netherlands it might take even longer.  
As previous studies have shown, the variation in factors that affect executives’ compensation level is 
remarkable. The factors originate from both inside and outside the firm and basis of these factors differ 
from governance policies and habits to regulation and legislation. As findings of Kaplan (1998) imply, 
influencing power of these factors seems to be high 
 
2.2. Prior CEO Compensation Studies 
The determinants behind the CEO compensation have been widely covered in research. There is robust 
evidence that, for instance, the firm’s level of cash holdings (Liu, 2011), the institutional ownership 
(Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Ozkan, 2011), the firm size (Sun et al., 2013; Carter et al., 2016) and the board 
size (Jensen, 1993; Ozkan, 2011) have all an effect on the level of the CEO total compensation2. Such 
determinants, which are not under CEO’s direct decision and influence the CEO’s total compensation, are 
in the literature generally referred as variables of expected CEO compensation (see e.g. Cai & Walkling, 
2011; Core et al., 2008; Larcker et al., 2011). 
Carter et al. (2016) and Core et al. (1999) study the link between the firm performance and the excess 
compensation3 which is the difference between the total compensation and the expected compensation 
model they built. Furthermore, both papers conduct ordinary least squares (OLS) regression explaining the 
subsequent firm performance with the excess compensation and multiple control variables. Both Carter et 
al. (2016) and Core et al. (1999) present statistically significant results suggesting that excess CEO 
compensation is followed by decrease in the firm’s subsequent performance. Both studies use data collected 
entirely from the US. 
Ozkan (2011) and Kato and Kubo (2006) focus on investigating the pay-performance elasticity with UK 
and Japanese data, respectively. Ozkan (2011) suggests there is a link between the CEO compensation and 
the firm stock return: increase in the shareholder return leads to higher CEO compensation growth in the 
US compared to the UK. According to Kato and Kubo (2006), similar link is found from Japan as well. 
                                                          
2 In existing literature (see e.g. Carter et al. (2016)) the CEO total compensation consists of salary, bonus, equity 
pay and other compensation. I use this formula in this study as well. 
3 Following an example by Carter et al. (2016), I use a term abnormal compensation in this study. 
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Their results suggest that the link is nevertheless weaker in Japan than in the US. Comparison with 
continental Europe is not done in either of the studies. 
Cai and Walkling (2011) and Larcker et al. (2011) investigate the Say-on-Pay regulations’ effect on stock 
returns. Both studies suggest that such regulation proposals lead to significantly positive abnormal returns 
in firms with abnormally high CEO compensation and, vice versa, negative returns in firms with abnormally 
low CEO compensation. The findings imply that the market recognizes the relationship between the CEO 
compensation and performance. In addition, both Cai and Walkling (2011) and Larcker et al. (2011) suggest 
that the market considers these two factors to be negatively related. Both studies use Say-on-Pay proposals 
and firm data from the US. 
In conclusion, prior studies have focused on either US, Japanese or UK companies and their findings 
suggest that the link between CEO compensation and firm performance does exist. However, I think that 
the prior findings, made with US, Japanese or UK compensation and firm data, cannot be applied to whole 
Europe without further analysis. This is because of the variation in corporate governance systems, executive 
compensation practices, legislation and regulation, one of which might conflict the previous findings. Thus, 
the aim of thesis is to empirically test whether abnormal CEO compensation has an influence on firm’s 
subsequent performance using European CEO and firm data. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
When a CEO’s observed total compensation differs from expected compensation, which is based on firm 
characteristics and governance related variables defined more precisely in Section 3.2, the CEO earns 
abnormal compensation. The purpose of this study is to test whether this abnormal compensation can be 
statistically tied to firm performance in following year. Thus, I state the null hypothesis as follows: 
H0: Abnormal CEO compensation is not linked to subsequent firm performance. 
If I can associate the abnormal CEO compensation to subsequent firm performance with statistical 
significance, an object of interest is whether this association is positive or negative. If the link found is 
positive, abnormal compensation may be an indicator of CEO’s superior talent (Hayes & Schaefer, 2000). 
This talent may be a rationale for beyond expected compensation and, thus, excess compensation might be 
an adequate decision businesswise. Therefore, I state the first alternative hypothesis as follows: 
H1A: Abnormal CEO compensation is linked to subsequent firm performance. Abnormal 
compensation can be associated with improved firm performance. 
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Alternatively, abnormal compensation may be in a relationship with subsequent firm performance, but 
estimates decreasing performance instead. In such case, abnormality of compensation may be a sign of 
agency problems between board of directors and CEO and it has an observable effect on firm performance 
(Core et al., 1999). The second alternative hypothesis is as follows: 
H1B: Abnormal CEO compensation is linked to subsequent firm performance. Abnormal 
compensation can be associated with decreased firm performance. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Data 
To test the hypotheses, I use a sample of CEO compensation and board data retrieved from BoardEx 
database. Corresponding firm performance and characteristics data is retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database. The complete sample (Sample A) starts from year 2000 and ends in 2013. The sample 
consists of 1459 firm years of 364 unique firms from 22 European countries. Currencies of all observations 
are exchanged to euro with a year-end exchange rate4. 
In addition to the complete sample, I use three alternative samples. First additional sample (Sample B) 
consists of firms which reporting currency is euro. With this exclusion my goal is to eliminate an impact of 
currency rates to domestic import and export which may cause distortions to firm performance measures 
when comparing firms with different currency rates. This sample comprises 850 firm years. 
In a second additional sample (Sample C) I eliminate financial sector. This is done because of differences 
in accounting figures between financial and nonfinancial firms. For instance, Fama and French (1992) 
emphasize the difference in interpretation of high leverage between financial and nonfinancial firms. High 
leverage is common quality in financial sector and not an indication of financial distress whereas in 
nonfinancial sector high leverage could mean troubled financial health (Fama & French, 1992). This sample 
is composed of 1234 observations. 
The last sample (Sample D) is a combination of the previous two. The sample includes only euro quoted 
firms operating in nonfinancial sector. Due to eliminations, the sample size is 705 firm years. Firms in each 
                                                          
4 Foreign exchange rates used are presented in Appendix 1. 
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sample are distributed in 12 industry groups classified by Fama and French5. The distribution of industries 
in samples are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Industry Distribution 
This table presents percentage distribution of industries in each sample. The industry classification is based on 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. In this study, the SIC codes are assigned to firms by highest 
contributing business segment to net sales or revenues. The assignation is retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope via Datastream. SIC codes held in each industry are presented in Appendix B.  
 
 
 
Percentage of Firms in Sample (%) 
 
Sample A     Sample B      Sample C      Sample D 
(N=1459)      (N=850)       (N=1234)      (N=705) 
1. Consumer Non-Durables 10.60 11.05 12.55 13.33 
2. Consumer Durables 3.28 5.64 3.89 6.81 
3. Manufacturing 12.45 9.87 14.74 11.91 
4. Energy 4.92 1.76 5.83 2.13 
5. Chemicals and Allied Products 3.83 4.35 4.53 5.25 
6. Computers & Business Equipment 9.78 10.46 11.50 12.77 
7. Telephone and Television Transmission 5.27 5.99 6.23 7.23 
8. Utilities 2.19 2.35 2.59 2.84 
9. Wholesale, Retail, Laundries, Repair Shops 6.98 7.52 8.26 9.08 
10. Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 8.00 6.82 9.47 8.23 
11. Finance 15.39 17.27 0.00 0.00 
12. Other 17.31 16.92 20.40 20.43 
 
 
3.2. Regression Models 
Following example of existing executive compensation studies (see e.g. Carter et al, 2016; Core et al, 2008), 
I present abnormal compensation as residual from expected compensation for each observation: 
 𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 = log⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡 − 𝐄(log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝))𝑖𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is abnormal compensation computed as residuals from the expected total compensation 
regression model for individual i in year t (presented in equation (2)), log⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡 is natural logarithm 
                                                          
5 The Fama & French classification details are presented in Appendix 2. Data retrieved from: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html, date 13-Nov-2017. 
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scaled sum of total direct compensation and total equity linked compensation of individual i in year t, and 
𝐄(log⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝))𝑖𝑡 is natural logarithm scaled total compensation computed with estimated coefficients 
of equation (2) for individual i in year t representing expected value of total compensation. 
BoardEx defines total direct compensation as a sum of salary, bonus, other compensation and employers 
defined retirement/pension contribution for the period. Further, total equity linked compensation equals 
sum of shares awarded, estimated value of options awarded and LTIPs (Long term incentive plan) awarded 
in the period6. The observed total compensation is a sum of the total direct compensation and the total 
equity linked compensation. 
I compute the expected total compensation with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model that is 
constructed on CEO’s personal background and holdings, board structure, firm’s size, firm’s investment 
opportunities, and year and industry fixed effects. CEO and board related data is retrieved from BoardEx 
and firm related from Datastream. The expected total compensation regression model is as follows: 
 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡 = 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽0 + 𝛽1log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 log(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽8+𝑗𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 +∑𝛽19+𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝑗
12
𝑗=1
⁡
11
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
 
(2) 
where log⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝)𝑖𝑡  is observed total compensation of individual i in year t, 𝛽0 is the intercept, 
log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm scaled total value of firm i securities CEO owns based on closing 
stock price of the annual report date in year t7, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of years individual i has been the 
chief executive officer in year t, 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡 is individual i’s duration of employment in the company in year t, 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the number of directors in board i in year t, 𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether 
individual i is also chairman of firm’s board in year t, log(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s natural logarithm scaled market 
value at year t end, 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 is book to market ratio of firm i at year t end, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s leverage calculated 
as total debt divided with total capital in year t, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 is a dummy variable of industry j, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 is a dummy 
variable for year j, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term of individual i in year t
8.  
I use coefficients from OLS regression equation (2) to compute the expected compensation 
𝐄(log⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝))𝑖𝑡. The abnormal compensation 𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is then computed as residuals from the 
                                                          
6 Definitions of CEO and Board data retrieved from 
http://metalib.ie.edu/ayuda/Varios/BoardExWRDSDataDictionary.pdf, date 14-Nov-2017. 
7 If BoardEx reports CEO’s total wealth as zero, I re-set the total wealth value equal to 1 to have logarithm scaled 
value of zero. 
8 Definitions of corresponding firm variables are retrieved from http://www-cgi.uni-
regensburg.de/Fakultaeten/WiWi/roeder/DownloadsGeneral/Datastream%20Worldscope.pdf, date 14-Nov-2017. 
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expected compensation model as presented in equation (1). The abnormal compensation is used in main 
regressions and robustness tests as presented in following section. 
To study the relationship between abnormal compensation and firm’s subsequent performance, I use 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS) regression models. To explain the variation 
in a dependent performance variable, return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1), I use 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 
multiple control variables as explanatory variables. In both main regression models and models to test 
results’ robustness, I measure dependent variable in period t+1 and explanatory variables in period t. 
Variable StockReturn is an exception as it is measured in period t-1. Thus, I present my main regressions 
as follows:  
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3log⁡(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
+ 𝛽6 log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +∑𝛽7+𝑗𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 +∑𝛽18+𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝑗
12
𝑗=1
⁡
11
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1, 
 
(3) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 is return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s total assets, 𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is 
the abnormal compensation of individual i in year t computed with equation (1) which is winsorized at 1% 
and 99% level, log(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s natural logarithm scaled market value at year t end,  log⁡(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 is 
firm i’s natural logarithm scaled total assets in year t, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s leverage calculated as total debt 
divided with total capital in year t, 𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑖𝑡 is number of closely held shares divided by common shares 
outstanding in firm i in year t, log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s natural logarithm scaled gross sales and other 
operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances in year t, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 is total return of firm 
i’s common stock in year t; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 is a dummy variable of industry j, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 is a dummy variable for year j, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1 is the error term of individual i in year t+1.  
According to the Gauss-Markov theorem, ordinary least squares coefficients are the best linear unbiased 
estimators if following assumptions hold: (1) the errors have zero mean, (2) the variance of the errors is 
constant and finite, (3) the errors are independent, and (4) the errors are unrelated to explanatory variables. 
It is fair to assume that when CEO’s compensation or firm’s size and performance are higher, variance of 
these measures increases as well. Thus, due to natural presence of heteroscedasticity (i.e. the variance of 
regression errors is not constant) in this type of study, I also conduct weighted least squares (WLS) 
regressions which are identical to ordinary least squares models, but observations are unequally weighted. 
WLS can used as an estimation procedure when the errors 𝜀 are uncorrelated, but variances of the errors 
are not unequal (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012). 
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To determine weights for the WLS regressions, I regress absolute values of residuals from the original OLS 
regression against fitted values of the original OLS regression as follows: 
|𝑅3,𝑖| = 𝐹3,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , (4) 
where 𝑅3,𝑖 is the residual of observation i from the OLS regression conducted with the equation (3), 𝐹3,𝑖 is 
the fitted value of observation i from the OLS regression conducted with the equation (3), and 𝜀𝑖 is the error 
term of observation i. 
The fitted values from the equation (4) represent estimates of standard deviations of the errors. Finally, the 
weights used in the WLS regressions are computed as follows: 
𝑊𝑖 =
1
𝐹4,𝑖
2, 
(5) 
where 𝑊𝑖is the the weight of observation i used in the WLS regression and 𝐹4,𝑖 is the fitted value of 
observation i from OLS regression conducted with equation (4). 
WLS regressions should yield results with constant error term variance. To test robustness of my results, I 
also conduct the OLS and WLS regressions with 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 and 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 performance ratios as 
dependent variables. Results of robustness tests are presented in Section 4.2. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents summary of descriptive statistics of variables I use in this study. The CEO background 
and firm governance variables Tenure, Dur, and AlsoChair are slightly right-skewed with higher means 
than medians and 75th percentiles further from medians than 25th percentiles. I find this expected because, 
intuitively, successful chief executive officers tend to hold their title while, as Kaplan (1997) suggests, 
CEOs with deficient performance are likely to be replaced rather quickly. Total wealth (log(Wealth)) 
appears to be symmetrically distributed around its mean and median. In addition, Dirs and CHS seems 
approximately symmetrical likewise, but standard deviation of closely held shares percentages is relatively 
high. However, I do not find this surprising since ownership structure of firms is not limited in any way. 
 
Distributions of firm size related variables log(MV), log(Assets), and log(Sales) are symmetrical around 
their median and values of mean and median are almost equal. Standard deviation of book to market (BM) 
and leverage (Lev) ratios are, expectedly, high. Sample firms operate on different industries of which 
average ratio of leverage and growth prospects differ naturally. Even after excluding financial sector, 
standard deviation remains remarkably high (see Panel C in Appendix C).  
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Performance variables StockReturn, ROA, and ROE appear to be symmetrically balanced around their 
means and medians, but variable EBIT is highly right-skewed with substantial deviation. Even after 
controlling for currency quotation and excluding financial sector (See Panels B-D in Appendix C), 
skewness remains. This firm size skewness is adjusted in Sales, Assets, and MV variables with logarithmic 
scaling. However, this can not be done with EBIT since number of firms in data have negative value of 
EBIT.  This might influence results of robustness tests conducted with variable EBIT. 
 
Table 3 presents pairwise correlations of variables used in this paper. As expected, number of directors on 
board (variable Dirs) correlates noteworthily (correlation over 0.500) with logarithm scaled values of Sales¸ 
Assets, and MV. The market value variable MV correlates significantly (correlation over 0.800) with values 
of Sales and Assets and noteworthily with variable EBIT. In addition, variable log(Assets)’s correlations 
with EBIT and log(Sales) are over 0.500. From perspective of this study, most interestingly any correlation 
between abnormal CEO compensation variable AbComp and other variables is not found: All pairwise 
correlations equal less than 0.040. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of complete data (Sample A) used. Sample period is 2000-2013 and 
observations are firm years. Data is retrieved from BoardEx and Datastream databases. Listed variables are the ones 
used in equations (1-3) and variables used in tests for robustness. Descriptive statistics for all samples are presented 
in Appendix C. 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑡 1459 7.939 2.340 6.916 8.284 9.469 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 (years) 1459 4.615 4.386 1.700 3.500 6.100 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡 (years) 1459 11.370 9.592 3.900 8.000 16.900 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  1459 12.490 4.483 9.250 12.000 15.000 
𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡 1459 0.397 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 1459 8.227 2.118 6.745 8.519 9.853 
𝐵𝑀𝑡  1459 1.094 6.907 0.317 0.496 0.768 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 (%) 1459 38.030 23.216 22.960 37.420 50.370 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 1459 0.232 0.322 0.010 0.010 0.396 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 1459 15.670 2.375 14.055 15.979 17.213 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 (%) 1459 25.320 24.225 1.445 19.215 41.825 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 1459 15.079 2.343 13.599 15.593 16.716 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 (%) 1459 1.157 0.753 0.847 1.099 1.319 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 (%) 1459 5.172 12.674 1.633 5.200 8.818 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 (%) 1459 12.371 47.944 5.325 12.930 20.610 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 (€ mn) 1459 2185.194 4793.817 53.780 476.600 2208.000 
log(Wealth)t = natural logarithm scaled total value of firm securities CEO owns cased on closing stock price of the 
annual report date in year t; Tenure t = number of years individual has been CEO in year t; Dur t = individual’s duration 
of employment in the firm in year t; Dirs t = number of directors in board in year t; AlsoChair t = dummy variable 
indicating whether CEO is also chairman of the board (1 = yes, 0 = no) in year t; log(MV) t = natural logarithm scaled 
total market value of the firm at year t end; BM t = book to market ratio of the firm at year t end; Lev t = leverage 
calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation 
(1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value at year t end; CHS t = 
percentage of closely held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total 
return of firm’s common stock in year t-1; ROA t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s total assets; ROE t+1 
= return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s equity in year t+1; and EBIT t+1 = earnings of a firm before interest 
expense and income taxes in year  t+1. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents pairwise correlations of variables used in this thesis. The correlations are calculated with complete data set (Sample A). 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1.⁡⁡log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑡 1.000                
2. ⁡⁡𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡  0.104 1.000               
3.⁡⁡𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡  0.132 0.474 1.000              
4. ⁡⁡𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  0.022 -0.051 0.154 1.000             
5.⁡⁡𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡  -0.112 0.066 0.115 0.097 1.000            
6.⁡⁡log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 0.392 -0.041 0.167 0.546 -0.007 1.000           
7.⁡⁡𝐵𝑀𝑡 0.012 -0.031 0.038 0.012 -0.059 -0.004 1.000          
8.⁡⁡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡  0.082 0.043 0.065 0.274 -0.028 0.235 0.104 1.000         
9.⁡⁡𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 -0.038 0.031 0.003 -0.029 -0.026 -0.068 -0.014 -0.002 1.000        
10.⁡⁡ log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 0.296 -0.039 0.159 0.630 -0.041 0.866 0.051 0.452 -0.062 1.000       
11.⁡⁡𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡  -0.272 0.077 -0.064 -0.150 0.076 -0.338 -0.064 -0.156 0.063 -0.314 1.000      
12.⁡⁡ log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 0.272 -0.015 0.205 0.578 0.009 0.833 -0.009 0.334 -0.058 0.893 -0.335 1.000     
13.⁡⁡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 0.034 0.003 -0.029 -0.047 0.008 -0.015 -0.008 -0.007 0.030 -0.049 -0.031 -0.073 1.000    
14.⁡⁡𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 0.135 0.036 0.052 0.013 0.040 0.219 -0.035 -0.121 0.009 0.088 0.003 0.204 0.073 1.000   
15. ⁡⁡𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 0.113 0.017 0.034 0.052 0.013 0.202 -0.006 -0.023 -0.002 0.129 -0.042 0.199 0.055 0.827 1.000  
16.⁡⁡𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 0.251 -0.064 0.020 0.272 -0.164 0.523 -0.009 0.131 -0.042 0.534 -0.228 0.494 -0.002 0.069 0.079 1.000 
log(Wealth)t = natural logarithm scaled total value of firm securities CEO owns cased on closing stock price of the annual report date in year t; Tenure t = number of years 
individual has been CEO in year t; Dur t = individual’s duration of employment in the firm in year t; Dirs t = number of directors in board in year t; AlsoChair t = dummy 
variable indicating whether CEO is also chairman of the board (1 = yes, 0 = no) in year t; log(MV) t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; 
BM t = book to market ratio of the firm at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; AbComp t = abnormal compensation 
computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value at year t end; CHS t = percentage of closely held 
shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common stock in year t-1; ROA t+1 = return on average of year 
t’s and year t+1’s total assets; ROE t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s equity in year t+1; and EBIT t+1 = earnings of a firm before interest expense and 
income taxes in year  t+1. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Main Regressions 
Summary of results from the main OLS regression is presented in Table 4. All regressions are estimated 
with control dummy variables Year and Ind, of which coefficients are omitted from the summary table 
because they are not in a scope of this study. All reported control variables are statistically significant at 
least at 5 percent level. As expected, the results imply that preliminary level of market value, sales and 
stock returns all have positive effect on firm performance in subsequent year. Concentration of shares to 
directly affiliated or majority stakeholders appears to have a slightly boosting effect on performance as 
well. In addition, subsequent return on assets appears to decrease if a firm holds substantial number of total 
assets or leverage.  
The abnormal CEO compensation variable AbComp is positive in all samples, but not statistically 
significant within 10 percent confidence level. The p-values of t-statistics of AbComp estimates are 35.95%, 
40.22%, 18.10%, and 13.06% for Sample A, B, C, and D, respectively. 
A positive coefficient of AbComp suggests that abnormal CEO compensation is associated with increased 
subsequent firm performance. This is contrary to findings of previous studies by Carter et al. (2016) and 
Core et al. (1999). Both Carter et al. (2016) and Core et al. (1999) found negative association between 
abnormal CEO compensation and firm performance with ordinary least squares regressions and US data. 
Although statistically insignificant, the results of positive coefficients throughout all samples contrast with 
previous findings with US data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 4 
Main OLS Regression Summary 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results from equation (3). Dependent variable is ROA t+1. 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C. Estimates 
of dummy variables Industry and Year are omitted from the summary because they are not in a scope of this study. 
Estimated coefficients are reported without parentheses and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.863 6.080 0.521 3.826 
 (-0.152) (1.022) (0.084) (0.354) 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 0.873 0.706 1.395 2.406 
 (0.917) (0.838) (1.339) (1.514) 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 3.024 2.791 3.376 2.825 
       (8.178)***       (8.459)***       (7.858)***      (4.524)*** 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 -5.341 -5.693 -7.057 -7.061 
       (-10.300)***       (-12.977)***       (-11.319)***      (-8.033)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 -0.045 -0.038 -0.059 -0.104 
       (-2.692)***     (-2.496)**       (-3.072)***      (-3.325)*** 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 0.044 0.028 0.042 0.045 
       (3.133)***     (2.500)**       (2.627)***     (2.062)** 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 4.004 4.127 5.396 5.591 
       (10.013)***       (12.221)***      (11.969)***       (8.864)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 1.506 1.347 3.258 4.591 
     (3.383)**       (4.054)***      (4.307)***      (4.065)*** 
N 1459 850 1234 705 
R Squared 0.186 0.313 0.225 0.214 
F-Statistic 10.560 12.000 11.610 6.100 
AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(MV) 
t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value 
at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; CHS t = percentage of closely 
held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common 
stock in year t-1; ROA t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s total assets. 
Table 5 presents the summary of the main WLS regression results. I found variance of the OLS regression 
error terms to be heteroscedastic as expected whereas the WLS regressions errors were homoscedastic9. 
The weights for regressions are computed with equations (4) and (5) using results from the OLS regressions 
                                                          
9 I tested the existence of heteroscedasticity with the Breush-Pagan test presented by Breusch and Pagan (1979). 
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presented in Table 4. All control variables are statistically significant at least at 5 percent level, except 
variable CHS in Sample B. In Samples B and C, the abnormal compensation variable AbComp is positive 
with statistical significance at 5 percent level. Signs of all variables (except Intercept) in the OLS 
regressions equal signs in the WLS regressions.  
Contrary to findings of Carter et al. (2016) and Core et al. (1999), the weighted least squares regression 
results are positive and in Samples B and C statistically significant. The results indicate that abnormal CEO 
compensation is not related to decreased firm performance, but rather vice versa. Based on the results solely, 
abnormal CEO compensation appears to have an increasing effect on subsequent return on assets and 
abnormal compensation might therefore be explainable by superior CEO talent. More detailed discussion 
of the results is presented in Section 4.3. 
Table 5 
Main WLS Regression Summary 
This table presents weighted least squares regression results from equation (3). The weights are calculated with 
equations (4) and (5). Dependent variable is ROA t+1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C. Estimates of dummy variables Industry and Year are omitted from 
the summary because they are not in a scope of this study. Estimated coefficients are reported without parentheses 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 9.787 25.340 2.636 5.905 
 (0.208)       (4.353)*** (0.234) (0.516) 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 0.079 1.543 3.818 2.596 
 (0.064)    (2.228)**     (2.213)** (1.556) 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 3.753 4.004 3.772 2.871 
       (6.878)***       (12.331)***       (4.682)***      (4.310)*** 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 -5.854 -5.668 -8.247 -7.275 
       (-7.556)***       (-13.464)***       (-6.886)***      (-7.691)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 -0.053 -0.027 -0.128 -0.111 
     (-2.220)**   (-1.829)*       (-3.674)***      (-3.354)*** 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 0.042 0.010 0.068 0.046 
     (2.269)**  (0.991)     (2.568)**     (2.009)** 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 3.425 2.249 5.925 5.666 
       (5.210)***       (5.966)***       (5.960)***       (8.106)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 1.131 0.730 6.978 4.584 
       (6.349)***       (9.357)***       (5.762)***       (3.972)*** 
Table 5 continues in the next page 
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Table 5 continued from the previous page 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
N 1459 850 1234 705 
R Squared 0.127 0.443 0.167 0.199 
F-Statistic 6.686 21.020 8.025 5.591 
AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(MV) 
t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value 
at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; CHS t = percentage of closely 
held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common 
stock in year t-1; ROA t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s total assets. 
 
4.2. Robustness Tests 
To test the results presented in Section 4.1., I conduct the OLS and the WLS regressions with different 
performance measures as dependent variables. The performance measures used in the robustness tests are 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 and 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+1.  
Robustness Test 1 is conducted with 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 as dependent variable. Table 6 and Table 7 report summaries 
for the OLS and the WLS regression results, respectively. The OLS regression results are almost equal to 
the Main OLS regression results. All variables’ signs and values are almost equal to ones presented in main 
OLS regression summary (Table 4). In the results conducted with dependent variable 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1, control 
variables Lev and CHS lose their statistical significance in Samples A and C. Some significance losses are 
seen in other Samples as well. In addition, goodness of fit (indicated by R Squared) decreases in Robustness 
Test 1 in all samples. 
Comparison of the WLS results of Robustness Test 1 (Table 7) and of the Main Regression (Table 5) yields 
partially similar interpretations. Variables AbComp, log(MV), log(Assets), log(Sales), and StockReturn have 
same sign, but significance is lost in some samples. The AbComp coefficient is statistically significant only 
in the regression performed with Sample B. Variables Lev and CHS have opposite signs in different 
samples. Differences in CHS cannot be explained with firms in samples, but it seems logical that leverage 
coefficient is different in Samples A and B (financial sector included) and Samples B and C (financial sector 
excluded). However, similar bifurcation is not seen in the WLS results conducted with ROA as dependent 
variable (Table 5). 
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Table 6 
Robustness Test 1: OLS Regression Summary 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results from equation (3). Dependent variable is ROEt+1. 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C. Estimates 
of dummy variables Industry and Year are omitted from the summary because they are not in a scope of this study. 
Estimated coefficients are reported without parentheses and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -22.801 -11.875 -17.843 -8.357 
 (-1.018) (-0.555) (-0.693) (-0.191) 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 2.367 1.506 3.347 7.572 
 (0.631) (0.498) (0.776) (1.178) 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 8.268 7.651 9.912 8.819 
       (5.668)***       (6.451)***       (5.577)***      (3.493)*** 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 -14.641 -14.960 -19.854 -21.269 
       (-7.159)***      (-9.485)***       (-7.699)***       (-5.985)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 -0.051 -0.096 -0.081 -0.357 
         (-0.764)   (-1.741)* (-1.016)       (-2.829)*** 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 0.049 0.076 0.047 0.165 
 (0.878)   (1.862)* (0.725)   (1.876)* 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 11.570 12.463 15.382 17.795 
       (7.335)***       (10.266)***       (8.249)***       (6.978)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 3.985 3.632 9.084 15.367 
     (2.269)**        (3.042)***       (2.903)***       (3.427)*** 
N 1459 850 1234 705 
R Squared 0.114 0.235 0.136 0.151 
F-Statistic 5.938 8.115 6.314 3.997 
AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(MV) 
t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value 
at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; CHS t = percentage of closely 
held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common 
stock in year t-1; ROE t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s equity in year t+1. 
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Table 7 
Robustness Test 1: WLS Regression Summary 
This table presents weighted least squares regression results from equation (3). The weights are calculated with 
equations (4) and (5). Dependent variable is ROEt+1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C. Estimates of dummy variables Industry and Year are omitted from 
the summary because they are not in a scope of this study. Estimated coefficients are reported without parentheses 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 14.196 99.817 3.252 -2.060 
 (0.459)       (3.570)*** (0.084) (-0.043) 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 0.675 4.606 7.965 9.032 
 (0.142)     (2.251)** (1.337) (1.280) 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 10.373 13.133 11.928 8.793 
       (4.934)***       (11.297)***       (4.376)***       (3.098)*** 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 -19.796 -13.363 -27.669 -22.160 
       (-6.512)***       (-8.237)***       (-6.683)***       (-5.480)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 0.107 0.337 -0.044 -0.396 
          (1.169)       (6.566)***   (-0.374)       (-2.803)*** 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 0.059 -0.007 0.109 0.175 
 (0.808)  (-0.192)  (1.193)   (1.808)* 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 12.911 0.337 19.736 18.314 
       (4.994)*** (0.249)       (5.861)***       (6.065)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 2.437 6.513 18.188 16.816 
       (3.751)***        (4.884)***       (4.258)***       (3.462)*** 
N 1459 850 1234 705 
R Squared 0.067 0.938 0.095 0.136 
F-Statistic 3.316 400.800 4.214 3.521 
AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(MV) 
t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value 
at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; CHS t = percentage of closely 
held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common 
stock in year t-1; ROE t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s equity in year t+1. 
The second robustness test is executed with dependent variable 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 and its OLS 
results are presented in Tables 8. Control variables of sales (log(Sales)), market value (log(MV)), total assets 
(log(Assets)), closely held shares (CHS), and stock return (StockReturn) have same signs as in the Main 
OLS results (Table 4) and the Robustness Test 1 OLS results (Table 6). The coefficients of these control 
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variables are all statistically significant at least at 5 percent level in all samples. The AbComp coefficient is 
negative in Sample B and positive in others without statistical significance within confidence interval of 90 
percent. 
Table 8 
Robustness Test 2: OLS Regression Summary 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results from equation (3). Dependent variable is EBITt+1/Assets 
t+1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C. 
Estimates of dummy variables Industry and Year are omitted from the summary because they are not in a scope of this 
study. Estimated coefficients are reported without parentheses and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 0.046 -0.065 0.065 0.118 
 (0.927)  (1.670)* (1.201)   (1.685)* 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 0.006 -0.009 0.014 0.000 
 (0.705) (-1.015) (1.502) (0.021) 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 0.041 0.033 0.046 0.033 
      (12.469)***       (9.015)***      (12.264)***      (8.023)*** 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 -0.073 -0.074 -0.089 -0.086 
    (-15.945)**      (-15.396)***      (-16.462)***       (-15.027)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
        (-0.253)  (0.101) (-0.957)  (-1.208) 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (4.125)***       (3.591)***       (3.053)***       (3.272)*** 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 0.052 0.053 0.064 0.065 
      (14.704)***      (14.359)***       (16.354)***       (15.790)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 0.011 0.008 0.023 0.019 
      (2.836)***    (2.398)**       (3.460)***       (2.684)*** 
N 1459 850 1234 705 
R Squared 0.303 0.365 0.346 0.411 
F-Statistic 19.970 15.150 21.140 15.700 
AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; 
log(MV) t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; log(Assets) t =  logarithm 
scaled market value at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year 
t; CHS t = percentage of closely held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; 
StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common stock in year t-1; EBIT t+1 = earnings of a firm before interest 
expense and income taxes in year  t+1. 
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Table 9 
Robustness Test 2: WLS Regression Summary 
This table presents weighted least squares regression results from equation (3). The weights are calculated with 
equations (4) and (5). Dependent variable is EBITt+1/Assets t+1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are presented in Appendix C. Estimates of dummy variables Industry and Year are omitted from 
the summary because they are not in a scope of this study. Estimated coefficients are reported without parentheses 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 0.250 0.229 0.352 0.327 
      (5.579)***       (3.544)***      (6.884)***      (4.530)*** 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 -0.007 -0.008 0.009 0.001 
 (-0.104) (-0.970) (1.172) (0.130) 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 0.052 0.037 0.062 0.042 
       (16.104)***       (9.807)***       (16.960)***      (9.981)*** 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 -0.066 -0.063 -0.075 -0.082 
       (-14.425)***      (-12.820)***       (-13.953)***       (-13.183)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
           (1.219)  (-0.429) (1.208) (-0.898) 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.241)     (2.265)**     (-2.366)**   (1.786)* 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 0.026 0.034 0.021 0.044 
       (6.492)***       (7.815)***       (4.540)***       (8.229)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.004 
     (2.037)** (1.604)      (2.883)*** (0.680) 
N 1459 850 1234 705 
R Squared 0.322 0.380 0.354 0.438 
F-Statistic 21.860 16.200 21.960 17.520 
AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation (1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; 
log(MV) t = natural logarithm scaled total market value of the firm at year t end; log(Assets) t =  logarithm 
scaled market value at year t end; Lev t = leverage calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year 
t; CHS t = percentage of closely held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; 
StockReturn t-1 = total return of firm’s common stock in year t-1; ROA t+1 = return on average of year t’s and 
year t+1’s total assets; ROE t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s equity in year t+1; and EBIT 
t+1 = earnings of a firm before interest expense and income taxes in year  t+1. 
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Table 9 presents the WLS regression results of the Robustness Test 2. Again, control variables log(MV), 
log(Assets), log(Sales), and StockReturn are on same side of zero and statistically significant, as in the Main 
and the Robustness Test 1 WLS results. Coefficients of variables Lev and CHS differ in samples and are 
not statistically significant throughout all samples. The prime variable of interest, AbComp, is not positive 
in all samples nor statistically significant in any of them.   
 
4.3. Discussion 
The main results and their robustness tests presented in Sections 4.1. and 4.2. do not hold a uniform line 
throughout the tests. The abnormal CEO compensation variable AbComp is positive in all samples in the 
both the Main and the Robustness Test 1 regressions. The coefficient of AbComp is found statistically 
significant in Samples B and D in the Main WLS regression and in Sample B in the Robustness Test 1 WLS 
regression. However, the Robustness Test 2’s AbComp coefficients are not positive throughout the samples 
nor statistically significant in any of them. Due to this inconsistency in the regression results, I fail to reject 
the null hypothesis stated in Section 2.3. as follows: 
H0: Abnormal CEO compensation is not linked to subsequent firm performance. 
Thus, a statistically significant relationship between the abnormal CEO compensation and subsequent firm 
performance cannot be confirmed with this test setting. Albeit the failure to reject the null hypothesis, I find 
the results highly interesting. 
Carter et al. (2016) and Core et al. (1999) findings suggest that abnormal CEO compensation is negatively 
associated with subsequent firm performance. Both studied the topic with US data and used ordinary least 
squares regressions. Contrary to their findings, my estimated coefficients of abnormal compensation 
variable AbComp are positive 21 times out of 24 regressions ran and statistically significant in three of these 
positive ones. Unquestionably, the results of this study are in contradiction to the findings of Carter et al. 
(2016) and Core et al. (1999). 
The main difference between previous studies and this study is the data used. To the best of my knowledge, 
the topic has not been researched before with Europe covering data. Considering the similarities in methods 
and the differences in data, I assume the controversial results arise from the latter factor. As presented in 
Sections 1.1. and 1.2., there are plenty of variation in governance and compensation practices between 
continents which might explain the results. 
As findings of Kaplan (1997) suggest, the level of executive compensation is high in the US whereas in 
Germany executive compensations are in general on moderate level. Kaplan (1997) reports that CEO 
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turnover is higher in Germany when a firm suffers earnings losses while in the US CEOs are more likely 
to lose their job when a firm’s sales decline. As Kaplan’s (1997) findings imply, in Germany CEOs are not 
as tolerated to generate earnings losses many years in a row as they are in the US. Thus exaggerating, CEOs 
in the US can keep their employment even when earnings decline if sales grow. This might be one of the 
key factors behind the controversial results of mine, because studies related to the relation between CEO 
compensation and firm performance measure performance with earnings ratios. 
In addition, as cited in Bruce et al. (2005), the average ratio between the CEO compensation and the average 
earnings of employees is over 500 in the US and only a little over 10 in central Europe. When general level 
of compensation is lower, I anticipate that the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance is more easily found. Furthermore, findings of Kaplan (1997) and Ozkan (2011) propose that 
CEO’s compensation is more flexibly in the US than in Europe because of higher proportion of equity-
based compensation.  I believe due to this, the residuals in regression models are lower, and thus, statistical 
significant link between the compensation and the performance can be easier to verify.  
Finally, differences in the Say-on-Pay regulations are substantial. For instance, Thomas and Van der Elst 
(2015) suggest that US shareholders have stronger means to influence executive compensation than UK 
shareholders do which increases the flexibility of CEO compensation in the US. Suggested lower flexibility 
in Europe might weaken the pay-performance link because CEO compensation is not as floating as it is in 
the US. Studies of Cai and Walkling (2011) and Larcker et al. (2011) support the view that shareholders 
are aware of this link in the US, but to the best of my knowledge, it is unstudied in Europe. 
In conclusion, the CEO compensation seems to be higher, more flexible and more controlled by 
shareholders in the US than in Europe. In addition, CEO’s employment is more easily cancelled in Europe 
when actual profit is decreasing. Because of differences in compensation characteristics, I believe the CEO 
compensation is in stronger relationship with subsequent firm performance in the US than in Europe. Due 
to turnover differences, I assume that abnormal CEO compensation is not an indicator of deficient 
subsequent firm performance in Europe, but rather vice versa. Even though not thoroughly statistically 
significant, the results of this study support this view. Adapting the findings Hayes and Schaefer (2000), 
abnormal CEO compensation might be an indicator of superior CEO talent in Europe. However, to verify 
the positive link between abnormal CEO compensation and firm performance and its interpretations, further 
research need to be conducted. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have analyzed the link between abnormal CEO compensation and subsequent firm 
performance with European CEO and firm data. I started with estimating abnormal CEO compensation for 
each observation with an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model. Next, I used the abnormal CEO 
compensation parameter in explaining subsequent firm performance. Relationship between the abnormal 
compensation and firm performance was tested with both ordinary least squares and weighted least squares 
(WLS) regressions. An original sample consisted of 1459 firm years and covered period of 2000-2013. I 
conducted the regressions with four different samples of which one was the original sample and other three 
were eliminated versions of it. With robustness tests included, in total 24 regressions were conducted to test 
the link between abnormal CEO compensation and subsequent firm performance.  
The abnormal CEO compensation coefficient was positive in both OLS and WLS regression results when 
dependent variable was return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE). However, statistically significant 
coefficient was found only three times out of 16 regressions conducted with these two dependent variables. 
When I measured the subsequent performance with dependent variable earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets (EBIT/Assets), the abnormal CEO compensation coefficient was not positive 
throughout all samples nor statistically significant in any of them. Negative coefficient was found three 
times out of eight regressions with EBIT/Assets as dependent variable. Due to inconsistency in the results, 
I decided not to reject null hypothesis stated as “Abnormal CEO compensation is not linked to subsequent 
firm performance”. 
Despite the failure to reject the null hypothesis, the results raise a series of questions. Previous researches 
have found a relation between abnormal CEO compensation and firm performance (see e.g. Carter et al., 
2016; Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2011; Kato & Kubo, 2006). Studies by Carter et al. (2016) and Core et al. 
(1999) suggest that abnormal CEO compensation is linked to decreased subsequent firm performance and, 
contrary to these findings, my results suggest that such link does not exist or if it does, the link is rather 
positive. These previous studies were conducted with US CEO and firm data while my research based on 
European data. Executive compensation practices, policies and regulations are remarkably different around 
the globe (see e.g. Kaplan, 1997; Bruce et al., 2005; Thomas & Van der Elst, 2015) which I believe are the 
key factors behind contrary findings of this study.  
However, determinants behind conflicting results need to be reviewed more closely. I suggest future 
research should focus on studying these differences in the determinants more closely to reliably find causing 
factors behind the conflicting results. In future, performance should be measured with other ratios and with 
wider range of econometric methods to obtain comprehensive set of results. In addition, different time 
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periods should be tested separately since this study’s sample period of 2000-2013 includes several high 
volatile market periods (e.g. the financial crisis and the European debt crisis) which may or may not have 
caused distortions to the sample used in this study.  
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Appendix A 
Exchange Rates  
This table presents the rates used in currency exchange. The values in table denote the amount of foreign currency 
one euro represents. The forex rates data is retrieved from 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/index.en.html, 
date 19-Oct-2017.  
Year USD DKK GBP SEK CHF NOK AUD 
1999 1.0046 7.4433 0.6217 8.5625 1.6051 8.0765 1.5422 
2000 0.9305 7.4631 0.6241 8.8313 1.5232 8.2335 1.6770 
2001 0.8813 7.4365 0.6085 9.3012 1.4829 7.9515 1.7280 
2002 1.0487 7.4288 0.6505 9.1528 1.4524 7.2756 1.8556 
2003 1.2630 7.4450 0.7048 9.0800 1.5579 8.4141 1.6802 
2004 1.3621 7.4388 0.7051 9.0206 1.5429 8.2365 1.7459 
2005 1.1797 7.4605 0.6853 9.3885 1.5551 7.9850 1.6109 
2006 1.3170 7.4560 0.6715 9.0404 1.6069 8.2380 1.6691 
2007 1.4721 7.4583 0.7334 9.4415 1.6547 7.9580 1.6636 
2008 1.3917 7.4506 0.9525 10.8700 1.4850 9.7500 1.9944 
2009 1.4406 7.4418 0.8881 10.2520 1.4836 8.3000 1.5969 
2010 1.3362 7.4535 0.8608 8.9655 1.2504 7.8000 1.3093 
2011 1.2939 7.4342 0.8353 8.9120 1.2156 7.7540 1.2696 
2012 1.3194 7.4610 0.8161 8.5820 1.2072 7.3483 1.2685 
2013 1.3791 7.4593 0.8337 8.8591 1.2276 8.3630 1.5430 
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Appendix B 
Fama-French industry classification 
This table presents the 12-industry classification by Fama and French. The classification is made with Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. In this thesis, the SIC codes are assigned for firms based on contribution of 
business segments to net sales or revenues. The assignation is retrieved from Thomson Reuters Worldscope via 
Datastream. Classification data retrieved from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html, date 13-Nov-2017. 
 SIC Codes 
1. Consumer Non-Durables 0100-0999, 2000-2399, 2700-2749, 2770-
2799, 3100-3199, 3940-3989 
2. Consumer Durables 
 
 
 
 
3. Manufacturing 
2500-2519, 2590-2599, 3630-3659, 3710-
3711, 3714-3714, 3716-3716, 3750-3751, 
3792-3792, 3900-3939, 3990-3999 
 
 
2520-2589, 2600-2699, 2750-2769, 3000-
3099, 3200-3569, 3580-3629, 3700-3709, 
3712-3713, 3715-3715, 3717-3749, 3752-
3791, 3793-3799, 3830-3839, 3860-3899 
4. Energy 
 
5. Chemicals and Allied Products 
 
6. Computers & Business Equipment 
 
 
7. Telephone and Television Transmission 
 
8. Utilities 
 
9. Wholesale, Retail, Laundries, Repair Shops 
 
1200-1399, 2900-2999 
 
2800-2829, 2840-2899 
 
3570-3579, 3660-3692, 3694-3699, 3810-
3829, 7370-7379 
 
4800-4899 
 
4900-4949 
 
5000-5999, 7200-7299, 7600-7699 
10. Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 2830-2839, 3693-3693, 3840-3859, 8000-
8099 
 
11. Finance 6000-6999 
12. Other - 
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Appendix C 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of data used (Sample A, Sample B, Sample C, and Sample D). Sample period 
is 2000-2013 and observations are firm years. Data is retrieved from BoardEx and Datastream databases. Listed 
variables are the ones used in equations (1-3) and variables used in tests for robustness. Sample A comprises of all 
firms, Sample B comprises of only euro quoted firms, Sample C comprises of all firms excluding financial sector, and 
Sample D comprises of only euro quoted non-financial firms. 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
Panel A: Sample A       
log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑡 1459 7.939 2.340 6.916 8.284 9.469 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 (years) 1459 4.615 4.386 1.700 3.500 6.100 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡 (years) 1459 11.370 9.592 3.900 8.000 16.900 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  1459 12.490 4.483 9.250 12.000 15.000 
𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡 1459 0.397 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 1459 8.227 2.118 6.745 8.519 9.853 
𝐵𝑀𝑡  1459 1.094 6.907 0.317 0.496 0.768 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 (%) 1459 38.030 23.216 22.960 37.420 50.370 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 1459 0.232 0.322 0.010 0.010 0.396 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 1459 15.670 2.375 14.055 15.979 17.213 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 (%) 1459 25.320 24.225 1.445 19.215 41.825 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 1459 15.079 2.343 13.599 15.593 16.716 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 (%) 1459 1.157 0.753 0.847 1.099 1.319 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 (%) 1459 5.172 12.674 1.633 5.200 8.818 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 (%) 1459 12.371 47.944 5.325 12.930 20.610 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 (€ mn) 1459 2185.194 4793.817 53.780 476.600 2208.000 
Panel B: Sample B       
log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑡 850 7.507 2.262 6.555 7.753 8.947 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 (years) 850 4.753 4.783 1.600 3.500 6.100 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡 (years) 850 11.480 9.752 3.900 7.900 17.550 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  850 12.690 4.434 10.000 12.000 15.000 
𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡 850 0.528 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 850 7.888 1.869 6.587 7.953 9.350 
𝐵𝑀𝑡  850 0.656 0.451 0.360 0.559 0.820 
Appendix C continues in the next page 
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Appendix C continued from the previous page 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 (%) 850 37.450 22.659 22.530 37.790 50.240 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 850 0.227 0.312 0.010 0.010 0.363 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 850 15.438 2.176 13.981 15.452 16.912 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 (%) 850 32.060 25.229 8.670 29.900 51.820 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 850 14.868 2.080 13.490 15.000 16.459 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 (%) 850 1.148 0.852 0.848 1.099 1.314 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 (%) 850 4.921 13.100 1.860 4.790 7.860 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 (%) 850 9.018 30.228 5.272 11.670 18.565 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 (€ mn) 850 1298.584 3048.615 42.037 304.050 1344.450 
Panel C: Sample C       
log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑡 1232 7.939 2.396 6.890 8.263 9.484 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 (years) 1232 4.750 4.506 1.700 3.600 6.250 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡 (years) 1232 11.650 9.702 4.100 8.400 17.400 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  1232 12.270 4.356 9.000 12.000 15.000 
𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡 1232 0.410 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 1232 8.202 2.092 6.733 8.521 9.774 
𝐵𝑀𝑡  1232 0.669 2.946 0.297 0.470 0.714 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 (%) 1232 35.460 20.556 22.560 35.810 47.450 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 1232 0.234 0.324 0.010 0.010 0.386 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 1232 15.415 2.118 13.944 15.889 17.039 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 (%) 1232 25.110 23.422 1.700 20.910 41.410 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 1232 15.138 2.227 13.889 15.617 16.643 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 (%) 1232 1.144 0.539 0.842 1.100 1.323 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 (%) 1232 5.714 13.152 2.825 5.840 9.325 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 (%) 1232 12.730 51.597 5.635 13.520 20.940 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 (€ mn) 1232 1926.449 4655.288 49.697 449.755 1999.719 
Panel D: Sample D       
log(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑡 705 7.460 2.277 6.452 7.748 8.881 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 (years) 705 4.807 4.908 1.700 3.600 6.000 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡 (years) 705 11.710 9.976 4.000 8.000 17.900 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  705 12.400 4.237 10.000 12.000 15.000 
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 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
𝐴𝑙𝑠𝑜𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑡 705 0.532 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
log(𝑀𝑉)𝑡 705 7.795 1.863 6.463 7.943 9.271 
𝐵𝑀𝑡  705 0.774 3.769 0.333 0.532 0.800 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 (%) 705 35.010 20.017 21.940 36.090 47.530 
𝐴𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 705 0.226 0.313 0.010 0.010 0.367 
log(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑡 705 15.162 1.915 13.817 15.337 16.756 
𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 (%) 705 31.620 24.352 10.040 29.900 51.120 
log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡 705 14.933 1.978 13.736 15.148 16.433 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 (%) 705 1.127 0.543 0.836 1.082 1.319 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 (%) 705 5.142 14.141 2.600 5.200 8.160 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+1 (%) 705 10.060 55.029 5.130 11.720 18.600 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 (€ mn) 705 913.053 2189.198 37.467 296.000 1124.000 
log(Wealth)t = natural logarithm scaled total value of firm securities CEO owns cased on closing stock price of the 
annual report date in year t; Tenure t = number of years individual has been CEO in year t; Dur t = individual’s duration 
of employment in the firm in year t; Dirs t = number of directors in board in year t; AlsoChair t = dummy variable 
indicating whether CEO is also chairman of the board (1 = yes, 0 = no) in year t; log(MV) t = natural logarithm scaled 
total market value of the firm at year t end; BM t = book to market ratio of the firm at year t end; Lev t = leverage 
calculated as total debt divided with total capital in year t; AbComp t = abnormal compensation computed with equation 
(1) in year t, winsorized at 1% and 99% level; log(Assets) t =  logarithm scaled market value at year t end; CHS t = 
percentage of closely held shares in year t; log(Sales) t = logarithm scaled gross sales in year t; StockReturn t-1 = total 
return of firm’s common stock in year t-1; ROA t+1 = return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s total assets; ROE t+1 
= return on average of year t’s and year t+1’s equity in year t+1; and EBIT t+1 = earnings of a firm before interest 
expense and income taxes in year  t+1. 
 
 
 
 
 
